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Contest based on a directed polymer in a random medium
Cle´ment Sire∗
Laboratoire de Physique The´orique – IRSAMC, CNRS
Universite´ de Toulouse, 31062 Toulouse, France
We introduce a simple one-parameter game derived from a model describing the properties of a
directed polymer in a random medium. At his turn, each of the two players picks a move among two
alternatives in order to maximize his final score, and minimize opponent’s return. For a game of
length n, we find that the probability distribution of the final score Sn develops a traveling wave form,
Prob(Sn = m) = f(m− v n), with the wave profile f(z) unusually decaying as a double exponential
for large positive and negative z. In addition, as the only parameter in the game is varied, we find a
transition where one player is able to get his maximum theoretical score. By extending this model,
we suggest that the front velocity v is selected by the nonlinear marginal stability mechanism arising
in some traveling wave problems for which the profile decays exponentially, and for which standard
traveling wave theory applies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a
Extreme value statistics of random variables has been
long studied by mathematicians [1, 2] and physicists
[3, 4, 5]. In physics, it naturally arises when studying
thermodynamical properties of disordered systems [6],
and in particular, the distribution of the ground state
energy [4, 5].
If the considered random variables E1, E2, ..., EN are
uncorrelated, the distribution of Emin = miniEi or
Emax = maxiEi becomes universal for large N , once
properly scaled [1, 2]. It takes the form of the Gumbel,
Fre´chet or Weibull distribution depending on the asymp-
totic properties of the distribution of the Ei’s. However,
in the case of strongly correlated random variables, there
are no general results, and it is usually a formidable task
to access to the distribution of Emin or Emax.
In [4], the authors study a simple model of a directed
polymer on a Cayley tree, inspired from the original work
of [6], but focussing on the ground state properties (i.e.
zero temperature). The simplest version of the model is
defined on a Cayley tree developed over n generations,
and with Z branches originating from each node. The
polymer made of n bonds starts from the root node, and
for a given path on the tree, the total length of the poly-
mer (assimilated to its energy) is
Epath =
∑
i∈path
li. (1)
The elementary lengths li are quenched random variables
associated to each bond of the tree and independently
drawn from the same random distribution ρ(l). The hi-
erarchical structure of the Cayley tree induces strong
correlations between the different possible energies (or
lengths) of the polymer. One is then interested in the
distribution of the minimal energy Emin, i.e. the ground
state energy. Because of these strong correlations, the
ground state energy distribution in not expected to fall
into one of the three universality classes arising in the
case of independent random variables [4, 5], the best
known of them being the Gumbel distribution [1, 2]. In
the special case of the binary distribution
ρ(l) = p δl,1 + (1− p) δl,0, p ∈ [0, 1], (2)
the authors of [4] obtained an unbinding transition when
p > pc = 1 − Z−1, where the polymer goes from a fi-
nite length to an extensive length 〈Emin〉 ∼ v(p)n. In
addition, the distribution of Emin has a traveling front
form
P (Emin, n) = f(Emin − v(p)n), (3)
where f(z) decays exponentially fast for large negative
argument. This last property and the general theory of
traveling waves [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] lead to a simple selection
mechanism for the front velocity v(p) (linear marginal
stability; see hereafter).
In the present work, we define a game theoretical
model, directly inspired by this directed polymer model.
Although our model lacks any thermodynamical refer-
ence, it is certainly related to other optimization prob-
lems, where the notions of extreme value statistics and
traveling front arise [3].
Two players A and B play an alternating game of du-
ration n, with player A starting the game. When it is his
turn to play, a player has a choice of Z possible moves.
Hence, the map of all possible game histories has the
structure of a Cayley tree with Z branches originating
from any node, and of length 2n. The i-th move by
player A brings him the additional score ai, whereas the
next play by player B add the value bi to the score of
player A. The score of player B is defined as the oppo-
site of that of player A. The elementary scores ai and
bi are quenched random variables independently drawn
from the same distribution ρ. Ultimately, the final score
of player A is
Epath =
∑
i∈path
ai + bi. (4)
2The goal of player A is to maximize its final score,
whereas player B will do his best to select his plays in
order to minimize the score of player A, and hence max-
imizing his own score. The two players have an a priori
knowledge of the game tree structure so that the final
score of player A is defined as
Sn = max
available choices of A
min
available choices of B
Epath. (5)
From now, we specialize to the case Z = 2, although
our results can be easily extended to any Z. Moreover,
we restrain ourselves to the elementary score distribution
given by Eq. (2). It should be emphasized that the play-
ers do not pick their next play in order just to maximize
its local outcome (i.e. A picking its next move among
available branches with ai = 1 or B picking the min-
imum available bi). If the players were adopting such
a simple depth-0 strategy, which would be their natural
approach if they did not have the prior knowledge of the
ai’s and bi’s distribution over the tree, the final score
of player A would be simply the sum of n independent
variables of mean p2 + 2p(1− p) (A picks a branch with
ai = 1, if there is one available), and n variables of mean
p2 (B picks a branch with bi = 0, if there is one avail-
able). Then the distribution of Sn would be a Gaussian
(of width σ ∼ √n), and mean 〈Sn〉 = v0(p)n, with
v0(p) = p
2 + 2p(1− p) + p2 = 2p. (6)
Note that this result is identical to the score velocity
obtained if the players had picked their move at random:
the depth-0 strategies of both players exactly annihilate.
Instead, having a global view of the game tree, the players
will try to direct the game into favorable branches for
them, in order to maximize their final score, even if they
may have sometimes to pick an unfavorable local move
(ai = 0 for player A, bi = 1 for player B) in order to
achieve their goal. For p > 1/2, there are more bonds
with ai = 1 or bi = 1, so that we expect that the objective
of player A should be easier to achieve than that of player
B. Hence, we anticipate that 〈Sn〉 = v(p)n, with
v(p) ≥ v0(p) = 2p, p ≥ 1
2
. (7)
In the opposite case p < 1/2, the above inequality is
obviously reversed. In fact, by exchanging the roles of A
and B (and neglecting the fact that A starts the game,
for large n), it is clear that one has the symmetry relation
[4],
v(p) + v(1− p) = 2. (8)
In addition, one has the trivial constraints,
v(0) = 0, v(1/2) = 1, v(1) = 2, (9)
which are consistent with Eq. (8).
An intermediate strategy to the ones presented above
corresponds to players having only a partial view of the
game tree up to a finite depth. For instance, if the players
have the knowledge of there next available move, and of
their opponent’s ensuing options, they should adopt the
following depth-1 strategy:
• Player A: if the options of player A are equal (both
ai = 0 or 1), A picks the branch for which the num-
ber of bi equal to 1 (when it will be the turn of B to
play) is maximal. If only one branch corresponds
to ai = 1, A choses this move.
• Player B: if the options of player B are equal (both
bi = 0 or 1), B picks the branch for which the
number of ai+1 equal to 1 is minimal. If only one
branch corresponds to bi = 0, B picks this move.
After a elementary but cumbersome calculation, we find
that the score velocity v1(p) corresponding to this depth-
1 strategy is given by,
v1(p) = 2p
2 7− 6p+ 4p2 − 14p3 + 14p4 − 4p5
1 + 2p+ 6p2 − 16p3 + 8p4 . (10)
One has v1(p) ≥ v0(p) for p ≥ 1/2, and v1(p) satisfies
the symmetry relation of Eq. (8) and the conditions of
Eq. (9). For higher but finite strategy depth, an analyt-
FIG. 1: (Color online) Sn+1 can be obtained recursively from
four optimized scores S
(k)
n (k = 1, 2, 3, 4), and finding the next
optimized move from player B and then from player A.
ical treatment becomes extremely complicated.
Let us now move back to our model, where both players
have a global knowledge of the game tree (infinite depth).
Obtaining the (not necessarily unique) optimal path re-
alizing both players antagonist goals can be achieved by
using the recursiveminimax algorithm [12], which gives a
more precise meaning to Eq. (5). Let us assume that we
have generated four instances of optimized scores S
(k)
n
(k = 1, 2, 3, 4) on four independent games of length n
(with the initial condition S
(k)
n = 0, for n = 0). In or-
der to construct an optimized score for a game of length
n+1, we first generate two intermediate scores including
3the previous move of player B (see Fig. 1),
R(1)n = min
(
S(1)n + b1, S
(2)
n + b2
)
,
R(2)n = min
(
S(3)n + b3, S
(4)
n + b4
)
. (11)
Then the final score is obtained by optimizing the first
move of player A over his two possible plays, a1 and a2
(see Fig. 1):
Sn+1 = max
(
R(1)n + a1, R
(2)
n + a2
)
. (12)
Using Eqs. (11,12), we can derive the corresponding re-
cursion relations for the cumulative distribution of Sn
and Rn,
Pn(m) = Prob (Sn ≤ m) ,
Qn(m) = Prob (Rn ≤ m) , (13)
and starting from the initial condition Pn(m) = 1 for
m ≥ 0, and Pn(m) = 0 for m < 0. Defining q = 1 − p,
we find
Qn(m) = 1− (1− qPn(m)− pPn(m− 1))2 (14)
Pn+1(m) = (qQn(m) + pQn(m− 1))2 . (15)
The intermediate distribution Qn(m) can be eliminated
by inserting Eq. (14) into Eq. (15), leading to a single
recursion relation between Pn+1 and Pn. The probability
density of Sn is defined as
pn(m) = Pn(m)− Pn(m− 1). (16)
We look for a traveling wave form for Pn(m)
Pn(m) = F (m− 〈Sn〉), 〈Sn〉 = v(p)n, (17)
with the boundary conditions F (z) → 1, for z → +∞,
and F (z) → 0, for z → −∞. The probability density of
Sn has a similar traveling wave form, associated to the
hull function f(z):
pn(m) = f(m− 〈Sn〉), f(z) = F (z)− F (z − 1). (18)
Inserting this ansatz into Eqs. (14,15), we find that F
satisfies the following functional equation√
F (z − v) = 1− q [1− qF (z)− pF (z − 1)]2
− p [1− qF (z − 1)− pF (z − 2)]2 , (19)
where we have used the shorthand notation v for v(p).
By retaining the leading contributions in Eq. (19) for
z → −∞, and for v > 0, we find
F (z − v) ∼ 4q4F 2(z), (20)
which leads to the double exponential asymptotics
F (z) ∼ f(z) ∼ 1
4q4
exp
(
−α−2
|z|
v
)
, (21)
where α− > 0 is an unknown p-dependent constant. Sim-
ilarly, in the opposite limit z → +∞, and assuming v < 2,
the functional equation Eq. (19) reduces to
1− F (z − v) ∼ 2p3(1− F (z − 2))2, (22)
which again leads to a double exponential decay
1− F (z − 1) ∼ f(z) ∼ 1
2p3
exp
(−α+2 z2−v ) , (23)
where α+ > 0 is some p-dependent constant. Hence, and
contrary to the standard traveling wave theory [3, 4, 5],
where the traveling front exponential decay for z → −∞
or z → +∞ permits the determination of the front veloc-
ity, v(p) remains so far undetermined. Here, the double
exponential decay obtained on both sides results from the
minimax constraint, instead of the usual min (or max )
constraint imposed when considering the ground state
energy or the minimum (or maximum) path length dis-
tribution [4, 5]. This fast decay of f(z) for z → ±∞
and the traveling wave form of Eq. (18) ensure that〈
(Sn − v(p)n)2
〉
remains bounded when n→ +∞.
v(p) can still be determined numerically, from its def-
inition 〈Sn〉 = v(p)n. The results are shown on Fig. 2,
along with v0(p) and v1(p) which correspond to depth-0
and depth-1 strategies respectively. The main feature of
v(p) is the existence of a critical value of p (denoted pc),
above which the score front velocity is v(p) = 2 (note
that one also has v′1(1) = 0). Moreover, and as men-
tioned above, v0(p) is a lower bound of v(p). Finally, for
p close to 1/2, v(p) grows linearly with p, with
v′0(1/2) = 2,
v′(1/2) ≈ 2.123(1),
v′1(1/2) =
37
16
= 2.3125. (24)
In the symmetric case p = 1/2, we find that 〈Sn〉 =
n + σ0, where σ0 = 0.14291695... is a strictly positive
constant, illustrating the slight advantage that A gains
from starting the game.
Let us give a physical explanation for the occurrence
of this transition. As p > 1/2 increases, the number of
paths along which all the ai’s and bi’s are equal to 1 grows
exponentially. Indeed, the probability of having such a
path is p2n, so that their total number in the tree is of or-
der 22n×p2n. The existence of this transition shows that
for p > pc, player A is able to chose his moves in order
to force the outcome of the game to follow one of these
path, with probability unity, as n → ∞. Symmetrically,
for p < 1− pc, player B will find enough branches along
which most ai’s and bi’s are equal to 0, in order to en-
force that the front velocity remains zero in this regime,
consistently with the symmetry relation of Eq. (8).
This transition can be understood analytically, by
studying the stability of a traveling front of velocity
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FIG. 2: (Color online) We plot the score velocity front v(p)
(full line), the lower bound v0(p) = 2p (lower dashed line),
and v1(p), obtained when the players adopt a depth-1 strat-
egy (upper dashed line). For p < 1/2, v(p) is obtained by
symmetry, using Eq. (8). The heuristic expression of Eq. (30)
cannot be distinguished from the numerical data at this scale.
v(p) = 2. Noting that Pn(2n) = Qn(2n + 1) = 1 (since
Sn ≤ 2n and Rn ≤ 2n+ 1), we consider the dynamics of
un = Pn(2n− 1) ≤ 1. From Eqs. (14,15), un satisfies the
recursion relation
un+1 =
[
1− p3(1− un)2
]2
, (25)
with u0 = 0. un = Pn(2n − 1) = 1 is an obvious fixed
point of Eq. (25), corresponding to the case v(p) < 2. If
this fixed point is selected, and after linearizing Eq. (25),
we find that
ln(1− Pn(2n− 1)) ∼ −2n, (26)
which is fully consistent with Eq. (23), with z = 2n −
1 − v(p)n. However, the recursion relation of Eq. (25)
has three other fixed points (x−, x+, x0), which can be
obtained analytically by solving a third order polynomial
equation, leading to cumbersome expressions. A detailed
analysis shows that x0 is always real, with x0 > 1. This
fixed point is unphysical and necessarily unstable. The
two other fixed points are real for p ≥ pc (x− < x+),
with
pc =
3
4
. 21/3 = 0.94494..., , (27)
and complex conjugates for p < pc. Moreover, one finds
that x− is maximal for p = pc, at which x± = 1/9.
Finally, a stability analysis shows that x− is the only
stable fixed point for pc < p ≤ 1. Hence, we conclude
that Pn(2n− 1) converges (exponentially fast) to x− for
pc < p ≤ 1, and that the distribution of Sn is peaked
near m = 2n and decays as a double exponential for
m ≪ 2n (as given by Eq. (21)), leading to v(p) = 2.
The obtained value of pc is in perfect agreement with
the numerical results for v(p) plotted on Fig. 2. Close to
p = 1, x− ∼ 9(1 − p)2 → 0, and up to second order in
(1− p), the distribution of Sn is thus given by
pn(2n) = 1− 9(1− p)2, pn(2n− 1) = 9(1− p)2. (28)
Note that if both players adopt a finite depth strategy,
this transition does not occur, as illustrated in Fig. 2
in the case of depth-0 and depth-1 strategies considered
above. By adopting a short-sighted strategy, player A
(respectively B) cannot direct, with probability 1, the
sequence of plays to a branch of the tree with a density
unity of playing options ai = bi = 1 (respectively ai =
bi = 0).
Finally, for p below but close to pc, we obtain a very
convincing fit of v(p) to the functional form
v(p) = 2− c (pc − p)1/2 + ..., (29)
with c ≈ 0.50(1), leading to an infinite slope for v(p)
at p = p−c , as found numerically on Fig. 2. In fact, for
p ≥ 1/2, we find that the simple heuristic functional form
v(p) = 2− 2
(
(pc − p)(1− p)
2pc − 1
)1/2
, (30)
fits the data with a relative accuracy better that 0.1%,
comparable although slightly higher than the estimated
numerical error bars of the data. This functional form
ensures that v(1/2) = 1 and that the behavior of Eq. (29)
is reproduced, and leads to the heuristic values,
v′(0) = 2.12099..., c = 0.49748..., (31)
in good agreement with the numerical estimates pre-
sented above.
Let us now address the properties of the hull function
f(z), and its cumulative sum F (z). First of all, if for a
given p, the corresponding v(p) happens to be a rational
number v(p) = α/β (α and β being mutually prime),
Eq. (19) implies that the hull function is only defined
on the discrete set of fractions of the form k/β. This is
in particular the case for p = 1/2 (v(1/2) = 1), p > pc
(v(p) = 2), and p < 1 − pc (v(p) = 0). On the other
hand, when v(p) is irrational, the set of points of the
form z = m − v(p)n is dense on the real axis, and f(z)
is a continuous function defined on the real axis. As
v(p) approaches v(pc) = 2 from below, the hull function
f(z) develops steps which blend into discontinuities as
p→ pc. This property is illustrated on Fig. 3, along with
the asymptotics obtained in Eqs. (21,23).
We now extend our original model in order to gain
some insight about the velocity selection mechanism.
This is achieved by modifying the model so that the
standard theory of front propagation will apply. In this
(A, ε)-model, player A always follows its best strategy,
while player B follows the depth-0 strategy (picking a
branch with bi = 0 if available) with probability ε and
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FIG. 3: (Color online) We plot the hull function f(z) for
p = 0.94495 > pc, for which v(p) = 2, and which is defined
on negative integer values of z (dots linked by a dotted line).
For p = 0.9449 slightly below pc (v(p) = 1.99684...), the hull
function is continuous but exhibits smooth steps at integer
values of z (corresponding thin line). Finally, for p = 0.75
(v(p) = 1.53146...), we plot the continuous hull function (thick
line) along with the predicted asymptotics of Eqs. (21,23)
(dashed lines).
its optimal strategy with probability 1 − ε. The origi-
nal model is hence recovered for ε = 0. The recursion
relation of Eq. (14) now becomes
Qn(m) = (1 − ε)
(
1− (1− qPn(m)− pPn(m− 1))2
)
+ε
((
q2 + 2pq
)
Pn(m) + p
2Pn(m− 1)
)
, (32)
while Eq. (15) remains unchanged. We denote the associ-
ated front velocity by vA(p, ε). Note that if B were play-
ing purely randomly, the terms q2+2pq and p2 in Eq. (32)
must be replaced respectively by q and p. This model
has exactly the same qualitative properties as the (A, ε)-
model, on which we hence concentrate, since player B
adopts a more intelligent strategy (some results obtained
for the random model will be mentioned in passing). In
the (B, ε)-model, one exchanges the role of players A and
B, and Eq. (15) is changed into
Pn+1(m) = (1 − ε) (qQn(m) + pQn(m− 1))2
+ε
(
q2Qn(m) +
(
p2 + 2pq
)
Qn(m− 1)
)
, (33)
whereas Eq. (14) still holds. When exchanging the role
of the two players, the associated front velocity vB(p, ε)
satisfies the symmetry relation,
vA(p, ε) + vB(1− p, ε) = 2, (34)
which reduces to Eq. (8), when ε = 0. However, for
ε > 0, vA(p, ε) and vB(1 − p, ε) do not obey the symme-
try relation of Eq. (8). In addition, we have the exact
inequalities,
vB(p, ε) ≤ v(p) ≤ vA(p, ε), (35)
since players B and A are respectively playing less opti-
mally in the (A, ε) and (B, ε)-models than in the original
model.
Because of the symmetry relation of Eq. (34), we focus
on the (A, ε)-model, and denote the associated velocity
simply by v. The (A, ε)-model main interest lies in the
fact that for ε > 0, P¯n(m) = 1 − Pn(m) decays expo-
nentially for m ≫ vn, so that the standard mechanisms
of front velocity selection do apply (see below). When
P¯n(m)≪ 1, the recursions of Eqs. (15,32) indeed lead to
P¯n+1(m) = 2ε
[
(1 + p)(1− p)2P¯n(m)
+p(1− p)(2p+ 1)P¯n(m− 1) + p3P¯n(m− 2)
]
, (36)
or equivalently, the front profile F¯ (z) = 1−F (z) satisfies
F¯ (z − v) = 2ε [(1 + p)(1− p)2F¯ (z)
+p(1− p)(2p+ 1)F¯ (z − 1) + p3F¯ (z − v)] , (37)
to be compared to Eq. (22), for the original model. The
simple ansatz F¯ (z) ∼ exp(−λz) leads to the dispersion
relation
v(λ) =
1
λ
ln
[
2ε
(
1− p+ peλ) (1− p2 + p2eλ)] , (38)
where the decay rate λ is so far undetermined.
Let us now summarize the main known mechanisms of
velocity front selection [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] for exponentially
fast decaying profiles. In many physical cases, including
those studied in [4, 5], a linear marginal stability (LMS)
argument shows that the selected front velocity corre-
sponds to the minimum velocity vmin allowed by the dis-
persion relation v(λ), associated to the decay rate λmin.
However, in some other cases [9, 10, 11], a bigger veloc-
ity is selected by a nonlinear marginal stability (NLMS)
mechanism. Without entering into too much details, let
us briefly explicit this point. Consider the large z asymp-
totics of a solution of the full nonlinear problem associ-
ated to the velocity v,
F¯ (z) ∼ A1(v) e−λ1(v)z +A2(v) e−λ2(v)z + ..., (39)
with λ1(v) < λmin given by the dispersion relation de-
rived from linear analysis. Note that the above linear
analysis does not grant access to A1(v), not to men-
tion the correction term proportional to A2(v). Now,
if there exists a velocity v∗ > vmin for which A1(v∗) = 0,
F¯ (z) will decay more sharply with rate λ2(v∗), which is
necessarily another root of the dispersion relation, with
λ2(v∗) > λmin. It can be shown that all traveling fronts
with velocity less than v∗ are then unstable against inva-
sion by a profile of velocity v∗, which leads to the selec-
tion of the velocity front v∗, instead of vmin [9, 10, 11]. In
practice, there are very few examples for which the tran-
sition between a linear and a nonlinear marginal stability
scenario can be analytically identified, since it requires in
6general a full solution of the profile associated to a ve-
locity v, in order to obtain A1(v). To the knowledge of
the author, all such tractable examples concern traveling
front in the spatial and temporal continuum [9, 10, 11],
like for instance,
∂P
∂t
=
∂2P
∂x2
+ P (1− P )(1 + κP ), (40)
for κ ≥ 1. In this case [9, 11], v(λ) = λ + λ−1, so that
vmin = 2 and λmin = 1. vmin is selected for 1 ≤ κ ≤
2, whereas v = v∗ = (κ/2)
1/2 + (κ/2)−1/2 (with λ1 =
(κ/2)−1/2 and λ2 = (κ/2)
1/2), for κ > 2.
Returning to our (A, ε)-model, we find that a non triv-
ial vmin exists for any ε > 1/2. It is obtained by first
finding λmin, the unique real positive solution of
v′(λmin) = 0, (41)
and setting vmin = v(λmin) in Eq. (38). In particular, we
find that vmin = 2, for p > pc, with
pc = (2ε)
−1/3. (42)
In the case ε = 1, when player B always adopts the
depth-0 strategy, we find pc = 2
−1/3 = 0.7937005...
Hence, we obtain the same kind of transition as in the
original model, where playerA is able to get its maximum
theoretical score. However, since B has a short-sighted
strategy, we do not observe a transition to v = 0 for
small but non zero p, as obtained in the original model
for p = 1 − pc. We actually find vmin ∼ − ln(2ε)ln(p) , when
p→ 0. Note that if B plays randomly instead of adopting
the depth-0 strategy, we obtain the dispersion relation
v(λ) =
1
λ
ln
[
2ε
(
1− p+ peλ)2] , (43)
and pc = (2ε)
−1/2.
However, for a given p, we find numerically that the
velocity given by the LMS mechanism vmin is only se-
lected for ε ≥ εc(p), so that the results of Eqs. (38,41,42)
are only valid for ε close enough to 1. For 1/2 < ε <
εc(p) < 1, and although a non trivial vmin does exist,
we find v > vmin. This strongly suggests the relevance
of the NLMS mechanism in this case. Unfortunately, for
1/2 < ε < εc(p) and a given v, there is very little hope
to obtain an analytical solution of the corresponding full
nonlinear equation for F (z), in order to apply the NLMS
criterion explained above. Likewise, for ε < 1/2, the
minimal positive velocity is vmin = 0 (v(λ = 0) = −∞),
and the prospect of an analytical solution appears even
bleaker. Note however that v and the associated de-
cay rate λ are still related by the dispersion relation of
Eq. (38).
On the bright side, the full line pc(ε) can be determined
exactly, by studying the dynamics of un = 1−Pn(2n−1),
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FIG. 4: (Color online) We plot the exact pc(ε) above which
vA(p, ε) = 2 (full line), whose LMS and NLMS expressions
are respectively given by Eq. (42) and Eq. (46). We also
plot the numerical estimate of εc(p) (thick dashed line), the
boundary between the LMS and NLMS domains of applica-
tion. These two curves cross at (εc, pc) =
(
4
5
, 5
1/3
2
)
(dot). We
also identify three domains according to the relation between
the observed front velocity v and the LMS velocity vmin.
in the same spirit as in the case ε = 0. We find that un
satisfies the exact recursion relation
un+1 ≡ gp,ε(un) = zn(2− zn), (44)
zn = p
3un(ε+ (1− ε)un), (45)
with u0 = 1. We then determine the value of pc(ε) above
which there exists a stable non trivial fixed point u∗(ε) 6=
0. For ε ≥ 4/5, we find that pc(ε) is indeed given by the
LMS argument, leading to the result of Eq. (42). On
the other hand, for 0 ≤ ε < 4/5, a regime were the
NLMS mechanism should be relevant, pc(ε) and u∗(ε)
are determined in the same spirit as in the case ε = 0, by
imposing that gpc,ε(u∗)/u∗ − 1 = g′pc,ε(u∗) − 1 = 0. We
find
pc(ε) =
[
(1− ε)1/2(4− ε)3/2 − 8 + 7ε+ ε2
2ε2
]1/3
, (46)
which goes smoothly to the result of Eq. (27), when ε→
0.
Interestingly, this analysis provides the exact value of
εc for the corresponding value of p = pc(εc) = (2εc)
−1/3,
at the transition between the LMS and NLMS regimes.
We thus find
εc
(
p =
51/3
2
= 0.854988...
)
=
4
5
. (47)
If B plays randomly instead of adopting the depth-0
strategy, one obtains
εc
(
p =
1 +
√
5
4
= 0.809017...
)
= 3−
√
5 = 0.763932...
(48)
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FIG. 5: (Color online) We plot the velocities vA(p, ε) (three
upper dashed lines; ε = 1, 4/5, 1/4 from top) and vB(p, ε)
(three lower dashed lines; ε = 1, 4/5, 1/4 from bottom). The
full line corresponds to v(p) for the original model (ε = 0).
In Fig 4, we plot our exact result for pc(ε) and a nu-
merical estimate of εc(p), the boundary between the LMS
and NLMS domains of application. In Fig 5, we plot
vA(p, ε) and vB(p, ε) for ε = 1, where B and A are re-
spectively adopting the depth-0 strategy, for ε = 4/5,
the smallest ε for which the LMS mechanism applies for
all p, and for ε = 1/4, for which the NLMS mechanism
holds for all p. We observe numerically that vA(p, ε) and
vB(p, ε) converge smoothly to v(p) as ε→ 0.
Let us finally address the subleading corrections to the
average score 〈Sn〉. The LMS mechanism implies [7, 10]
that
〈Sn〉 = vminn− 3
2λmin
lnn+ ... (49)
In the (ε, p) regime where the LMS mechanism applies,
we have confirmed numerically the occurrence of this log-
arithmic correction, as well as its magnitude. In the
NLMS regime, we find instead that the next correction
to 〈Sn〉 = vn is constant. Quite generally, this result can
be justified analytically whenever v > vmin, in particular
when the NLMS mechanism applies [13]. This property
was exploited in order to obtain the numerical estimate
of εc(p) shown in Fig 4, and this criterion is found to be
fully consistent with defining εc(p) as the value of ε for
which v becomes equal to the velocity vmin selected by
the LMS mechanism (see Eqs. (38,41,42)).
In the present work, we have defined a simple two-
player game inspired by a model of directed polymer on
the Cayley tree. The fact that the two players have an-
tagonist goals is reminiscent of the notion of frustration
quite common in disordered physical systems. In our
model, this frustration originates from the minimax con-
straint, which is, however, quite uncommon in physics.
As a consequence, the present model has no thermo-
dynamical interpretation. We found that the score dis-
tribution develops a traveling wave form, with the hull
function unusually decaying superexponentially for large
negative and positive arguments. We have justified an-
alytically the occurrence of a transition, across which a
player can obtain his maximum theoretical score, what-
ever the strategy of the other player. Contrary to systems
for which the standard traveling wave theory applies, we
did not succeed in understanding analytically the process
which leads to the selection of the velocity front. How-
ever, after studying an extension of the original model, we
strongly suggest that the selection mechanism is related
to nonlinear marginal stability, arising in some traveling
wave problems for which the profile decays exponentially.
I am very grateful to Satya Majumdar for fruitful dis-
cussions. I also wish to thank one referee for suggesting
studying a model where only one player is adopting the
optimal strategy whereas the other plays randomly.
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